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Judicial Power in Latin America:
a Short Survey
Abstract: This article, written by Teresa M. Miguel-Stearns, explores the vast differences
in judicial authority not only between the common law and civil law traditions, but also
among various countries steeped in the civil law tradition in Latin America. Judicial
review, certiorari, precedent, and other functions and characteristics of the judiciaries of
five distinctly different countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico) are
compared and contrasted with each other and with the common law tradition. This
evaluation demonstrates that despite their, arguably, similar distant histories and legal
foundations, each country has evolved into a unique legal system with significant
differences in the treatment of the judiciary and its jurisprudence.
Keywords: legal systems; judiciary; Latin America
OVERVIEW
Latin American legal systems are often thought of collect-
ively, but each country has a unique structure and each
country’s system has been influenced by a variety of legal
traditions and international sources. The judiciary in Latin
America is often minimalised and marginalised due to the
notion that legal systems of the countries are based on
civil law, which assumes that even high courts are weak.1
Since inception, the judiciaries in many Latin
American countries have undergone radical changes to
both structure and importance, and have taken on a new
identity and role in many societies. Judicial authority has
been considered and reconsidered during judicial reforms
throughout Latin America in the 20th and 21st centuries.
Judicial reform encompasses: 1. the types of conflicts a
particular court can resolve ( judicial review); 2. who can
bring certain actions before particular courts (standing);
3. the ability of a court to control its docket (certiorari2);
and 4. the nature and effect of court decision on future
matters (stare decisis,3 erga omnes,4 inter partes,5 and the
like).6 All of these factors directly affect the power held
by a court. A court that has the authority to control its
docket and issue binding decisions, for example, is more
powerful than one that must hear every petition before it
and whose decisions only apply to the parties involved.7
The nature of judicial review varies among courts in the
region. For example, whereas in common law jurisdictions,
courts are limited to hearing a posteriori cases, i.e. controver-
sies brought by parties challenging enacted laws, many
courts in Latin America have both a posteriori jurisdiction as
well as a priori jurisdiction, which are challenges to laws
before they are enacted, often referred to as abstract cases.8
Further, several countries, like Mexico, Argentina, and
Brazil, rely on their supreme courts to decide matters of
constitutional law as well as other questions of legal
importance. Other countries, such as Bolivia, Colombia,
and Chile, have created separate constitutional courts
exclusively to hear cases of a constitutional nature, thus
relieving their supreme courts of this power and duty.
Also unique to Latin America is the concept of
amparo.9 The Mexican Constitution of 1857 introduced
amparo to Latin America, various versions of which have
been adopted by every country in the region (except
Cuba). Amparo in its many forms allows citizens to bring
an action in court against the government for a violation
of fundamental or constitutional rights. It is meant to be
restorative as opposed to compensatory, and is a means
of providing relatively immediate relief in otherwise over-
loaded and slow judicial systems.10
A significant question confronting Latin American
countries and their judiciaries is how much importance
to give to the decisions, constitutional and non-consti-
tutional, of their highest courts. In common law juris-
dictions, the legal rationale in a decision by a higher
court binds all lower courts answerable to that higher
court. A decision on a point of law by the highest
court of the land binds all courts and establishes the
law of the land.11
In civil law jurisdictions, such as those in Latin
America, courts traditionally are limited to applying the
laws that have been created by the legislature or by
executive decree. Jurisprudence has not historically been
a source of law. In fact, most court decisions are inter
partes, binding only the parties to the case before the
court; they do not even have erga omnes effect, which
would allow courts to issue decisions that could then be
applied to cases stemming from the same event or with
similar circumstances. Thus, many tribunals are deciding
the same case and controversy hundreds of times.12
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The concept of stare decisis, which creates a rule of
law requiring binding precedent for other courts to
follow, is not part of the legal tradition of Latin American
countries. However, the common law notion of persua-
sive or binding jurisprudence is no longer completely
non-existent in the region.13 In the table below, Antonio
Canova González divides Latin American national courts
into three categories based on the nature of their deci-
sions pertaining specifically to constitutional jurispru-
dence: binding, followed, and orientating.14
This paper uses the below chart as a starting point to
explore the current state of judicial authority in several
countries. It also directs readers to electronic resources
for the jurisprudence of these countries.
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS /
UNITED MEXICAN STATES
The Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (SCJN), the
highest court in Mexico, has two chambers: one for civil
and penal cases, and the other for administrative and
labour cases. Each chamber has five justices with the
Chief Justice weighing in only during plenary sessions for
certain cases, such as amparo matters, conflicts between
the two chambers, and constitutional questions.18 The
SCJN has original jurisdiction in two types of cases:
Constitutional Controversies (involving disputes among
political powers such as the judiciary, executive, legisla-
ture, states, and federal government), and Actions of
Unconstitutionality (pertaining to the constitutionality of
laws). The bulk of its cases come from appeals by the dis-
trict and appellate courts.19
Mexico is one of the few countries in Latin America
that expressly binds its lower courts to the decisions of
the highest court under very specific circumstances. For
example, according to Article 192 of the Ley de Amparo
of 1936, when eight justices of the SCJN decide a par-
ticular question of law and issue an opinion, and the deci-
sion is upheld five consecutive times by eight justices of
the SCJN sitting en banc or 4 justices if sitting in Sala
(Chamber), the interpretation becomes jurisprudencia
which signifies binding precedent on all state and federal
courts.20 In April 2013, Mexico promulgated a new Ley
de Amparo which provides the same guidelines in Articles
222–224: jurisprudencia is binding on all courts when no
less than eight justices sitting in plenary session, or four
justices sitting in Sala, decide the same point of law five
times in five different and consecutive cases. Once estab-
lished, jurisprudencia can only be overturned by a unani-
mous vote of the SCJN.21
Another grant of power to establish jurisprudencia is
Article 232 of the Organic Law of the Federal Judicial
Branch.22 The system of reiteration to form binding pre-
cedent from the Federal Electoral Tribunal is slightly
more complicated under this law:
The Upper Chamber is required to issue three
consecutive decisions upholding a different point
of law regarding to the same issue. Regional
Chambers are required to issue five consecutive
decisions upholding a different point of law
regarding the same issue, in addition to the ratifi-
cation by the Upper Chamber. For these courts
to establish a binding decision, they must meet
these requirements, but must also obtain a
formal declaration from the Upper Chamber,
stating that a binding decision has actually been
made.23
In addition to reiteration as a form of creating binding
precedent, the SCJN can create precedent when settling
conflicts between the Chambers of the CSJN or the
Table 1 – What is the nature of jurisprudence of the court that decides constitutional questions?15
Constitutional jurisprudence that
is expressly binding precedent
for other courts
Constitutional jurisprudence
is followed by courts though
not officially binding
Constitutional jurisprudence that
serves only to orient
other judges
Bolivia16 Argentina Chile
Costa Rica Brazil17 Ecuador
Guatemala Colombia Honduras
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various Collegiate (appellate) courts. The CSJN sitting en
banc must settle conflicts between the Chambers of the
SCJN, whereas one of the two Chambers of the CSJN
may settle conflicts among the Collegiate courts.24
The 1994 judicial reforms that created the two
actions challenging constitutionality, Constitutional
Controversies and Actions of Unconstitutionality, also
gave the SCJN the power to establish precedent-setting
decisions in these matters, though with a high threshold.
Actions of Unconstitutionality (a priori review which can
only be brought by the Attorney General and other
specific government officials) call for a supermajority of
eight of the eleven justices. Constitutional Controversies
(requiring an actual controversy between two govern-
ment bodies) also requires the affirmation of eight of
eleven justices for binding precedential effect, but allows
for inter partes application with a simple majority.25
Some scholars argue that the system of binding
precedent in Mexico lends itself to a lower caseload
for the courts, especially as compared to a country
such as Brazil.26 However, there are many other
reasons why Brazil’s court system has such a severe
backlog of cases.
SCJN Decisions:
The SCJN (www.scjn.gob.mx/Paginas/Inicio.aspx) provides
electronic access to the decisions of the courts through
different means and publications: (1) a searchable data-
base containing public versions of the judgments of the
SCJN in full-text, Word format, 2003 to date; and (2)
Semanario Judicial de la Federación, containing various
texts to find cases including the Gaceta and Tesis y
Ejecutorias from 1917.27
REPÚBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL /
FEDERATED REPUBLIC OF BRAZIL
Like Mexico, Brazil does not have a separate constitution-
al court. In fact, any court in Brazil may decide the con-
stitutionality of any law or decree while deciding a
controversy before that court. This determination has
inter partes effect28 except when declared to be a sumula
vinculante (discussed in more detail below). Lower court
decisions are normally appealable up to the highest
court, the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) of Brazil.
Composed of eleven justices, the STF generally sits in
panels of five justices.29
The 1988 Constitution of Brazil included significant
judicial reform, broadening access to the courts in many
respects. One example is the ability of the STF to hear a
priori cases through Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality
brought by certain political actors, such as the president,
leaders of congress, state governors, attorneys general,
and the federal bar association; and pertaining to the con-
stitutionality of laws, such as those passed by Congress
and the federal and state legislatures.30 A minimum of
eight justices are required to hear a Direct Action of
Unconstitutionality, and at least six are needed to declare
the law or decree unconstitutional.31
Further, the Declaratory Action of Constitutionality,
modified by Constitutional Amendment 3 in 1993
(Emenda Constitutional 3/1993), allows the STF to declare
the constitutionality of a governmental policy upon the
request of the President, Congress, or Attorney General.
After a declaration of constitutionality, which carries with
it erga omnes effect, the policy can no longer be con-
tested in the lower courts.32
The STF acts as the last court of appeal in a posteriori
cases. The STF must accept all appeals; there is no prac-
tice of certiorari. STF decisions generally apply inter partes
only; there is no erga omnes effect. Also, except in very
limited instances, the decisions of the STF are not binding
upon the lower courts.33
The concept of precedent began infiltrating Brazilian
jurisprudence in 1964 when the STF was given the means
to declare súmulas. Súmulas are short, official restate-
ments of the Court’s recurrent position on a particular
issue of the law which carry great persuasive force and
tend to determine the outcome of similar cases.34 Once
a rule has been created by súmula, any argument to the
contrary will be rejected by the court.35 Beginning in
1964, there have been 736 súmulas declared and issued,
the last of which was in 2003.36
The declaration of binding precedent (Súmula
Vinculante (SV)) for the STF was first approved in
Constitutional Amendment 45 in 2004 (Art. 103-A,
Emenda Constitutional 45/2004). This power allows the
STF to declare an a posteriori case decision and rationale
legally binding precedent for the lower courts. An SV can
only be issued with an affirmative declaration and the
support of eight of the eleven justices.37 Since inception,
there have been 37 súmulas vinculantes declared.38
Constitutional reforms providing greater access to the
courts, coupled with very little precedent-setting ability
and the inter partes effect of decisions, led to the explo-
sion of cases and the resulting backlog in the judiciary.
Further, government agencies are known for appealing cases
simply to avoid compensating litigants. From 2000–2009,
over one million cases were filed with the STF.39
STF Decisions
Prior to 1 January 2011, jurisprudence of Brazilian courts
was published in the official judicial gazette, Diário da
Justiça. This gazette has been discontinued and decisions
are now published in the Diário Oficial.40
The Federal Supreme Court (STF) website maintains a
database where one can search for jurisprudence of the
court, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/jurisprudencia/pesquisar
Jurisprudencia.asp. There are pages dedicated to súmulas,
http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=juris
prudenciaSumula, and súmulas vinculantes, http://www.stf.
jus.br/portal/cms/verTexto.asp?servico=jurisprudenciaSumula
Vinculante. Note the STF has also provided translations
102
Teresa M. Miguel-Stearns
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 27 Sep 2015 IP address: 130.132.173.19
for several cases in various languages, http://www.stf.jus.
br/portal/jurisprudenciaTraduzida/jurisprudenciaTraduzida.
asp.41
Please see the GlobaLex guide for Brazil for a thor-
ough although somewhat outdated overview of the coun-
try’s legal system: http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/
Brazil.htm.
LA REPÚBLICA DE ARGENTINA/ THE
REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA
The Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN),
Argentina’s highest tribunal, has seven justices. The CSJN
was created in 1853 by the Argentine Constitution and
modeled after the Supreme Court of the United States of
America.42 The decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court and
scholarly treatises of North American jurists continued
to influence Argentine jurisprudence throughout the
19th century.43
As a result, the CSJN follows notions of judicial
review similar to the U.S. Supreme Court. The CSJN will
only hear a posteriori controversies where the parties
have standing, the case is ripe, and the controversy is not
moot.44 Thus, the CSJN does not hear a priori (abstract)
cases as do many other high courts in the region follow-
ing civil law tradition.
One significant difference between the CSJN and the
Supreme Court of the United States is that the decisions
of the CSJN bind only the parties to the ruling of the
Court; there is no express doctrine of stare decisis.45 Over
time, however, the CSJN has successfully persuaded the
lower courts to follow the rulings of the CSJN by stating,
for example, that it is the “moral duty” of the lower
courts to follow the nation’s supreme tribunal.46 The
CSJN subsequently scolded lower courts for not
following CSJN decisions and declared that such behaviour
undermines the judiciary as an institution.47 Lower courts
have generally been complicit such that although not
expressly stated in the Constitution or elsewhere, the
decisions of the CSJN have evolved into binding precedent
in many regards,48 though to what extent remains
unclear.49
CSJN Decisions
The website of the Supreme Court of the Nation (http://
www.csjn.gov.ar/jurisprudencia.html) has scanned pdfs of
the Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, the
official print court reporter, and official born-digital pdfs.
One can search for jurisprudence of the court in several
ways: by date for the recent decisions; by theme for sum-
maries of all decisions dating back to the court’s incep-
tion in 1863; by keyword (or more advanced search) for
full-text decisions from 1994; and by browsing a list of
cases organized chronologically.50 Infojus (http://www.saij.
jus.gov.ar/) also provides CJSN jurisprudence.51
Please see the GlobaLex guide on Argentina for an
excellent overview of the country’s legal system: http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Argentina1.htm.
ESTADO PLURINACIONAL DE
BOLIVIA / PLURINATIONAL STATE OF
BOLIVIA
Bolivia has a fascinating history of granting judicial
power, pulling it away, and reinstating it. Judicial review
was first granted to the Tribunal Supremo de Justicia (TSJ)
in the Constitution in 1861.The 1878 Constitution went
further and gave the TSJ the power to decide the consti-
tutionality of law, decrees, and regulations. Like
Argentina, the TSJ was modeled after the Supreme
Court of the United States in many respects, but, also
like Argentina, with some fundamental differences. For
example, TSJ decisions were merely inter partes (as
opposed to the erga omnes effect of U.S. Supreme
Court decisions); yet the TSJ was the only court in the
country with the authority to declare the unconstitu-
tionality of laws (similar to the U.S. system). Also, there
was no system of precedent in the Bolivian judiciary, as
there is in the U.S. model. Thus, Bolivia’s judiciary was
unlike any in the region, combining traits of various judi-
cial models in the Americas.52
The late 19th and 20th centuries in Bolivia were turbu-
lent, marked by a civil war, a change from conservative to
liberal to military leaders, a geographic change in the
country’s capital (from Sucre to La Paz, except for
the TSJ), and a return to democracy in 1982. During the
early 20th century, judicial review expanded as did the
power of the lower courts to hear constitutional matters
such as writs of habeas corpus and amparo. The 12-
member TSJ had the responsibility to review lower court
decisions. By the 1990s, these constitutional matters
were often delayed for more than one year in the lower
courts and a further year in the TSJ; other constitutional
matters were delayed for as many as three or four years.
This inefficiency, which resulted in a lack of citizen pro-
tection combined with other political pressures of the
fixed-term (10 years) justices of the TSJ, formed the
impetus to establish the Tribunal Constitutional de Bolivia
(TCB) and a return to a centralized model for constitu-
tional review.53
The TCB was created with the 1995 Bolivian
Constitution and was given judicial review power well
beyond what had been granted to the TSJ, including: 1)
erga omnes decision-making power; 2) the power to
create binding precedent; and 3) both i priori and i poster-
iori authority review of legislation. The TCB was concep-
tualized and created to be a body completely
independent of any other branch of government; but
compromise with an objecting TSJ placed the TCB within
the judicial branch, yet independent of the TSJ.54 The
TCB had five magistrates who served 10-year terms,
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elected by a 2/3 vote of all members present in a joint
session of Congress.55
With the establishment of the TCB, came the cre-
ation of nineteen different types of legal instruments,
twelve of which were unique to the TCB, giving the TCB
original and exclusive jurisdiction in these twelve matters.
The various instruments specified who would have stand-
ing to use a particular type, and ensured direct access to
the TCB for political entities and politicians as well as
the general public. In the first decade of the court
(1999–2009), the vast majority of complaints filed before
the TCB were amparo actions (58%) and habeas corpus
motions (26%).56
Despite broad access to the TCB, surveys showed
that the Bolivian public did not trust the neutrality of the
TSJ or the TCB, which led to political attacks against the
justices of the high courts.57 The election of Evo
Morales, the first indigenous president in a country that
is 85% indigenous,58 led to unprecedented political
upheaval and reform. Within the judiciary, countless
judges resigned or were impeached for many reasons. By
December 2008, the TSJ operated with only eight of
twelve members; and by late 2009, the TSJ lost its
quorum with only six justices remaining.59
The TCB suffered a similar fate. By late 2006, the
TCB had lost three of its five magistrates following accu-
sations of bribery from President Morales that were later
withdrawn. The Court was forced to operate with only
two principal magistrates and three alternates. The fol-
lowing year, however, the entire Court was subjected to
impeachment proceedings initiated by the President and
overseen by Congress. By the end of 2007, only two
alternate justices remained following the resignation of
the other three. Although the TCB could not hear cases
without a quorum, individual justices could sign adminis-
trative decrees, which they did. Eventually, a fourth
justice resigned when Congress initiated impeachment
proceedings against her after she signed a highly contro-
versial decree denying a recall election for President
Morales. The TCB was paralyzed.60 At the same time, a
new Constitution went into effect in 2009, and the Ley
del Deslinde Jurisdiccional established two parallel jurisdic-
tions within the court system in Bolivia: ordinary and
indigenous.61
In February 2010, Congress approved a law allowing
the president to appoint interim justices and magistrates
for both high courts. Congress also approved the coun-
try’s first popular election for members of the high
courts for December 2010.62 Nonetheless, the TCB was
disbanded in 2011 and replaced in 2012 with the Tribunal
Constitucional Plurinacional (TCP).
Decisions of the TCP constitute binding precedent.
The Law of the Constitutional Tribunal, Article 8, states
that decisions of the TCP are vinculante (binding) in nature.
Additionally, the Code of Constitutional Procedure, Article
15, provides more specifically that sentences, declarations,
and autos of the TCP bind the parties to the case except
for Actions of Unconstitutionality, which have broader
application. Additionally, legal rationale in the decisions of
the TCP constitutes binding precedent for all future deci-
sions in all courts.63 This law is clearly an effort to distin-
guish ratio decidendi from obiter dicta in order to make the
TCPs’ legal rationale precedential in nature in a way that
has not before been established in Brazil or Latin
America generally; it seems more akin to the common
law notion of what is binding precedent and what is
merely dicta. It will take time to see if this is the case,
and to evaluate the true power and authority of the
new TCP.
Finding Court Decisions:
Jurisprudence of TCB and the TCP can be found on the
new website of the TCP: http://buscador.tcpbolivia.bo/%
28S%28bezaphpqhzpzbjq2fvxqk25p%29%29/Default.aspx.
One can search for decisions by date, party, or number.
The Supreme Court of Justice also has a website,
http://tsj.bo/, where one can search by keyword in an
attempt to locate court decisions, http://tsj.bo/buscador-
autos-supremos/.
Please see the GlobaLex guide on Bolivia for an excel-
lent introduction to the country’s legal framework: http://
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Bolivian_Legal_Framework.
htm.
LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE / THE
REPUBLIC OF CHILE
The Corte Suprema (CS) and the Tribunal Constitucional
(TC) are the highest courts in Chile. The CS is part of
the Poder Judicial (Chilean federal judiciary) and acts as a
court of cassation. It hears appeals from the appellate
courts as well as other tribunals that are not part of the
judiciary, such as the environmental courts, intellectual
property court, and local police courts.64 The TC is an
independent body that reviews treaties, proposes reforms
to the Constitution, and reviews certain laws for constitu-
tionality i priori as well as i posteriori; and resolves constitu-
tional questions arising from the country’s highest courts,
the Corte Suprema, the Cortes de Apelaciones, and the
Tribunal Calificador de Elecciones (Electoral Tribunal).65
Despite the lack of stare decisis in Chile, jurisprudence
of these highest courts has evolved over many years and
is often used in support of a decision or for illustrative
purposes, or somewhere in between support and
illustration.66
Article 3 of Código de Procedimiento Civil (Code of Civil
Procedure), combined with more than a century of trad-
ition, dictates that court decisions are not a formal source
of law in Chile.67 In March 2012, the Chilean Congress was
presented with a proposal for a new Code of Civil
Procedure. This proyeto proposes to “unify” the jurispru-
dence in certain types of cases and remains under consider-
ation.68 Debate continues as to whether Chilean Supreme
Court decisions should have any authority. Those in
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opposition believe that awarding the power to establish
binding precedent to Supreme Court decisions will diminish
judicial independence. Those in favour point to common
law countries as examples where judicial independence and
a system of precedent and stare decisis reside side-by-side.69
Court Decisions:
The website of the TC contains the decisions of the
Court. Decisions can be examined by year (from 1972):
http://www.tribunalconstitucional.cl/index.php/sentencias/
busca_eras; or found through searching: http://www.tri-
bunalconstitucional.cl/index.php/sentencias/busca_basico.
The posting of decisions is current.
The Poder Judicial website contains the resolutions of
matters heard before the CS as well as the appellate
courts and others: http://basejurisprudencial.poderjudicial.cl/.
There are advanced search options to guide one through
this free but somewhat complex database.
Please see the GlobaLex guide on Chile for an over-
view of the country’s legal system: http://www.nyulawglo
bal.org/globalex/Chile1.htm.
CONCLUSION
This short survey of judicial power in five Latin
American countries demonstrates the many similarities
as well as the vast differences among the judiciaries of
the region. It is apparent that countries are experiment-
ing with different models, creating new processes, and
transplanting practices from other jurisdictions and tradi-
tions as they attempt to solve problematic issues while
keeping true to their legal foundations. Thus, the modi-
fied and tailored principles of judicial authority, including
judicial review, standing, certiorari, and precedent, con-
tinue to evolve, as do many other aspects of the judi-
ciary and legal system generally, just as in all democratic
societies.
Footnotes
1 “This view of case law has its roots in the Code Napoleon and can be traced into the nineteenth century codes of civil law
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